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11 Introduction
It is widely documented that unemployment varies between the regions of a country (Isser 
man et al., 1986, Gordon, 1987, Blanchﬂower and Oswald, 1994), between cities of diﬀerent
sizes and functions (Marston, 1985), between the inner and outer areas of cities and between
the urban and rural areas. There are also stark spatial diﬀerences in incomes. For exam 
ple, in the United States, the median income of central city residents is 40 percent lower
than that of suburban residents. Despite these features, very few theoretical attempts have
been made to better understand the working of the urban labor market and, in particular,
urban unemployment and spatial wage dispersion. Indeed, labor economists and macro 
economists traditionally do not incorporate space directly into their studies (see e.g. Layard
et al., 1991; Pissarides, 2000; Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004), even though there are some
well known empirical studies of local labor markets (see e.g. Holzer, 1989; Eberts and Stone,
1992). Similarly, in urban economics, despite numerous empirical studies, the theory of ur 
ban labor economics has been relatively neglected. In most advanced urban textbooks (see,
in particular, Fujita, 1989; Fujita et al. 1999; Fujita and Thisse, 2002) it is mainly assumed
throughout perfect competition in the labor market and the issue of urban unemployment
is not even discussed.
It seems, in particular, quite natural to introduce space in a search matching model
(Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999, Pissarides, 2000) because distance interacts with the diﬀu 
sion of information. In his seminal contribution to search, Stigler (1961) puts geographical
dispersion as one of the four immediate determinants of price ignorance. In most search
models, say for example Diamond (1982), distance between agents or units implies a ﬁxed
cost of making another draw in the distribution. In other words, a spatial dispersion of
agents creates more search frictions.
There is by now a small literature on urban search models (Zenou, 2009a,b). In all
these models (Simpson, 1992; Coulson et al., 2001; Sato, 2001; 2004; Wasmer and Zenou,
2002; 2006; Smith and Zenou, 2003; Zenou, 2009c), the wage is determined by a bilateral
bargaining between the ﬁrm and the worker so that all workers are paid the same wage and no
spatial wage distribution emerges in equilibrium. There is however an important literature
in search (Mortensen, 2003) focussing on wage dispersion where ﬁrms post wages instead of
bargaining them with workers. The starting point is the Diamond paradox (Diamond, 1971),
which says that, when all workers are identical, then, even in the presence of search frictions,
2the only equilibrium is for all ﬁrms to post the reservation wage of workers. In order to
obtain a wage dispersion and to avoid the Diamond paradox, researchers have introduced
multiple job oﬀers (Burdett and Judd, 1983), workers’ heterogeneity (Albrecht and Axell,
1984), and on the job search (Burdett and Mortensen, 1998).
The aim of this paper is to develop an urban search model in which ﬁrms post wages and
derive the implications in the land and labor markets. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the ﬁrst paper that does so.
To be more precise, we ﬁrst consider a model where all workers are homogenous and locate
in a monocentric city. We characterize the steady state equilibrium, which requires solving
simultaneously an urban land use equilibrium and a labor market equilibrium. We show
that the Diamond paradox holds. We also show that higher unemployment rate increases
the employed workers’ utility but decreases the equilibrium housing price in the employment
area. We then extend this model by considering two types of workers who diﬀer according
to the value imputed to leisure. We show that, under some conditions, there is a spatial
wage dispersion so that the Diamond paradox does not hold anymore. We show that the
commuting cost aﬀects the land market but also the labor market through wages. We also
ﬁnd that workers’ productivity aﬀects housing prices and that this impact can be positive or
negative depending on the location in the city. We then run some numerical simulations to
reproduce some stylized facts about the labor market outcomes of black and white workers.
We ﬁnd that a reduction in commuting costs for all workers reduces the unemployment rate
of white workers and the proﬁt of all ﬁrms but increases the wage of all workers (black and
white) and raises the fraction of ﬁrms posting the high wage.
To summarize, the contribution of our paper is threefold:
(i) We propose an alternative model of urban labor markets to the one usually used
in the literature. In fact, this is the ﬁrst paper which has a wage posting mechanism; all
other models use a Nash bargaining wage setting. This has important consequences for the
equilibrium since ﬁrms has a monopsony power in the former while they share the surplus
in the latter.
(ii) In the heterogenous case (Section 3), we can match some stylized facts from the
United States. By reinterpreting the model in terms of black and white workers and running
numerical simulations, we are able to reproduce interesting facts and derive some interesting
policy conclusions such as the impact of a transport cost policy on the labor market outcomes
3of black and white workers.
(iii) We can also analyze the Diamond paradox when space is introduced. Most of the
results obtained in the non spatial case are robust when a land market is considered.
2 Ex ante identical workers
There is a continuum of ex ante identical workers whose mass is N and a continuum of
ex ante identical ﬁrms whose mass is 1. Among the N workers, there are L employed
and U unemployed so that N = L + U. The workers are uniformly distributed along a
linear, closed and monocentric city. Their density at each location is taken to be 1. There
is no vacant land in the city and all land is owned by absentee landlords. All ﬁrms are
exogenously located in the Business District (BD hereafter) and consume no space. The BD
is a unique employment center located at one end of the linear city. In a centralized city, it
corresponds to the Central Business District (CBD), whereas, in a completely decentralized
city, it represents the Suburban Business District (SBD). Workers are assumed to be inﬁnitely
lived, risk neutral and decide their optimal place of residence between the BD and the city
fringe. The land market is competitive whereas the labor market is not.
There is no on the job search and thus only the unemployed workers search for a job and
receive information about job openings. We denote by aU the oﬀer arrival rate faced by an
unemployed worker.1 Workers respond to oﬀers as soon as they arrive. There is no recall.
Jobs are destroyed at exogenous rate δ. It is assumed that there exists a cumulative wage
distribution function F(wL) that is known by everybody, i.e. workers know F(wL) but do
not know which ﬁrm oﬀers which wage. The support of F(wL) is [0,wL], where wL is very
large.
A steady state equilibrium requires solving simultaneously an urban land use equilibrium
and a labor market equilibrium. It is convenient to present ﬁrst the former and then the
latter.
2.1 Urban land-use equilibrium
Each individual is identiﬁed with one unit of labor. Each employed worker goes to the
BD to work and incurs a ﬁxed monetary commuting cost τ per unit of distance. When
1The subscripts U and L stand for “unemployed” and “employed” respectively.
4living at a distance x from the BD, he/she also pays a land rent R(x), consumes 1 unity of
land and earns a wage wL (that will be determined at the labor market equilibrium). The
instantaneous (indirect) utility of an employed worker located at a distance x from the BD
is equal to:
WL(x) = wL − τ x − R(x) (1)
and the bid rent is:2
ΨL(x,WL) = wL − τ x − WL (2)
where WL is the common utility level obtained by all employed workers in the city. Con 
cerning the unemployed, they commute less often to the BD since they mainly go there to
search for jobs. So, we assume that they incur a commuting cost sτ per unit of distance,
where 0 < s ≤ 1 is a measure of search intensity or search eﬃciency; s is assumed to be
exogenous. For example s = 1 would mean that the unemployed workers go everyday to the
BD (as often as the employed workers) to search for jobs. Thus, here, the cost of searching is
captured through the increase in commuting costs since higher s implies higher commuting
costs sτ x. This is mainly because it is assumed that information about jobs is only gath 
ered in the employment center (BD).3 Unemployed workers consume 1 unity of land and
thus their instantaneous (indirect) utility when residing at a distance x from the BD is given
by:
WU(x) = wU − sτ x − R(x) (3)
where wU indicates the unemployment insurance payment. The bid rent is thus given by:
ΨU(x,WU) = wU − sτ x − WU (4)
where WU is the common utility level obtained by all unemployed workers in the city. Because
the bid rent of the employed workers is steeper than that of the unemployed workers, the
2The bid rent is a standard concept in urban economics. It indicates the maximum land rent that a
worker located at a distance x from the BD is ready to pay in order to achieve a utility level (Fujita, 1989).
3We could also have introduced other search costs that are not-distance related. This would have com-
plicated the model without altering any of our results.
5former live close to jobs while the latter reside farther away. This pattern can capture both
the European and American situations. Indeed, if the BD is interpreted as the Central
Business District, then we have the European structure where the rich/employed workers
live in the city center and the poor/unemployed at the outskirts of the city. If the BD is
the Suburban Business District, then the rich/employed workers live at the periphery while
the poor reside in the city center. What is important here is that in both situations the rich
live close to jobs, which is the case in Paris and London and in New York or Los Angeles
(Brueckner et al., 1999; Glaeser et al., 2008).

















L),0} at each x ∈ (0,N] (7)
Equations (5), (6) and (7) reﬂect the equilibrium conditions in the land market. Equation
(5) says that, at the city fringe N, the bid rent of the unemployed workers must be equal to
the agricultural land rent RA, which is normalized to zero without loss of generality. Equation
(6) states that, at L, the border between the employed and unemployed workers, the bid
rent oﬀered by the employed is equal to the bid rent oﬀered by the unemployed workers.
These two equations guarantee that the equilibrium land rent is everywhere continuous in
the city. Finally, equation (7) deﬁnes the equilibrium land rent as the upper envelope of the
equilibrium bid rent curves of all workers and the agricultural rent line. Observe that since
all N workers consume 1 unit of housing each, and since there will be no vacant land inside
the city, the distance from the BD to the urban fringe must be given by N and the border
by L. As a result, the employed reside between 0 and L whereas the unemployed reside
between L and N. Solving these equations leads to:
W
∗
U = wU − sτ N (8)
W
∗
L = wL − (1 − s)τ L − sτ N






τ (sN − x) + (1 − s)τN (1 − u) for 0 ≤ x ≤ L
sτ (N − x) for L < x ≤ N
0 for x > N
(10)
Observe that the labor market aﬀects the land market through both the unemployment rate
and the wage. In particular, higher wages increases workers’ utility while higher unemploy 
ment rate increases the employed workers’ utility but decreases the equilibrium housing price
in the employment area. Indeed, when u increases, L = (1 − u)N, which is both the size
of the employment area and the employment level, decreases. As a result, on average, the
employed workers are closer to jobs and thus spend less in commuting costs, which increases
their utility. This, in turn, decreases their bid rent (see (2)) and thus the housing price
within the employment area also decreases at each x.
2.2 Labor-market equilibrium
We can now solve the labor market equilibrium. We follow here the wage posting literature
(Mortensen, 2000, 2003) where the total mass of ﬁrms is ﬁxed to 1, so that there is no a free 
entry condition and thus no endogenous job creation. Also, the contact rates for both ﬁrms
and workers are exogenous and not determined using a matching function (as in Pissarides,
2000). Of course, as shown by Mortensen (2000) and Gaumont et al. (2006), including these
two aspects in a wage posting model is straightforward and does not generally change the
results.
Employed workers The Bellman equation for the employed workers is given by:
rIL(wL) = wL − (1 − s)τ N (1 − u) − sτ N − δ[IL(wL) − IU] (11)
where r is the discount factor.
Indeed, employed workers obtain today W ∗
L = wL − (1 − s)τ N (1 − u) − sτ N, but can
lose their job at rate δ, and then obtain a negative surplus of −[IL(wL) − IU]. Equation (11)
implies that:
IL(wL) − IU =
wL − (1 − s)τ N (1 − u) − sτ N − rIU
r + δ
(12)
7There is thus a reservation wage wr
L, i.e. the wage below which unemployed workers refuse
to accept a job oﬀer, which is deﬁned as follows:
IL(w
r
L) − IU = 0 ⇔ w
r
L = rIU + (1 − s)τ N (1 − u) + sτ N (13)
Unemployed workers The Bellman equation for the unemployed workers is given by:




[IL(wL) − IU]dF(wL) (14)
where aU is the exogenous job acquisition rate. Indeed, unemployed workers obtain today
W ∗
U = wU −sτ N, but can have a contact with a ﬁrm at rate saU, and transform this contact
into a match if the oﬀer is greater or equal than the reservation wage wr
L. In that case, they
obtain a positive surplus of IL(wL) − IU. As stated above, there is a cost of searching s,
which is captured by the total commuting costs sτ N, and a reward since higher job search









which, using (12), is equivalent to:
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[wL − (1 − s)τ N (1 − u) − sτ N − rIU]dF(wL)
Using (13), we ﬁnally obtain:
w
r









Unemployment rate The dynamics of the unemployment level is equal to:
d[u(t)N]
dt
= δ[1 − u(t)]N − saU u(t)[1 − F(w
r
L)] N
where u(t) is the unemployment rate at time t. Indeed, at each time t, [1 − u(t)]N em 
ployed workers lose their jobs at rate δ while u(t)N unemployed workers ﬁnd a job at rate
saU u(t)[1 − F(wr
L)], which is the product of the contact rate saU u(t) and the acceptation








δ + saU [1 − F(wr
L)]
(16)
8Employment size in a ﬁrm Denote by l(wL) the employment level of a ﬁrm that
oﬀers a wage wL to its employees. Denote also by G(wL) the proportion of employed workers




= saU [F(wL) − F(w
r
L)]u(t)N − δG(wL,t)[1 − u(t)]N
where d[G(wL,t)(1 − u(t))N]/dt is the variation of employed workers receiving a wage no
greater than wL, saU [F(wL) − F(wr
L)]u(t)N is the ﬂow at time t of unemployed workers
into ﬁrms oﬀering a wage no greater than wL, δG(wL,t)[1 − u(t)]N is the ﬂow at time
t of employed workers out of ﬁrms oﬀering a wage no greater than wL. In steady state,








We can now determine the employment size in a ﬁrm. The employment size l(wL) (i.e., the
measure of workers) per ﬁrm earning a wage wL can be expressed as
l(wL) = lim
ε→0
G(wL) − G(wL − ε)
F(wL) − F(wL − ε)
(1 − u)N (18)
where [G(wL) − G(wL − ε)](1 − u)N represents the steady state number of workers earning
a wage in the interval [wL − ε,wL] and F(wL) − F(wL − ε) is the measure of ﬁrms oﬀering
a wage in the interval [wL − ε,wL].
Lemma 1 Equation (18) is equivalent to
l(wL) =
saU N
δ + saU [1 − F(wr
L)]
(19)
Proof. See the Appendix.
Equation (19) speciﬁes the steady state number of workers available to a ﬁrm oﬀering
any particular wage, conditional on the wages oﬀered by other ﬁrms, represented by the
distribution F(.), and the workers’ reservation wage wr








L)] iﬀ wL ≥ wr
L
0 iﬀ wL < wr
L
(20)
9Wage posting Firms post wages. As in Burdett and Mortensen (1998), ﬁrms are
interested in maximizing steady state proﬁt, and will hire as many workers as are willing to















iﬀ wL ≥ wr
L
0 iﬀ wL < wr
L
(21)







and thus F(wL) is degenerate to one point w∗
L = wr
L.
Proof. See the Appendix.
This means that w∗
L = wr
L is a mass point and the wage distribution is degenerate to one
point w∗
L = wr
L. This result is due to the fact that l(wL) is independent of wL. This is the
so called Diamond’s paradox (Diamond, 1971).
2.3 Steady-state equilibrium














L = wU + (1 − s)τ N (1 − u) (22)









δ + saU [1 − F(wr
L)]
 
10and since 1 − F(wr











The unemployment beneﬁt wU, is the only labor market part of the wage. The equilibrium
wage w∗
L increases with wU because rIU increases and thus workers are more demanding and
increase their reservation wage. This is what is obtained in the non spatial search model.





, is what ﬁrms must give to workers to
compensate for the spatial cost diﬀerence between employed and unemployed workers. This





, i.e. when the land rent of
employed and unemployed workers is the same. In particular, if aU increases or δ decreases,
then wages increase because the spatial cost diﬀerence between employed and unemployed





￿ 0 ⇔ s ￿
1
2
Indeed, there are two opposite eﬀects of an increase of s on the wage w∗
L. On the one
hand, increasing s reduces the spatial compensation since the spatial cost diﬀerence between
employed and unemployed workers is smaller. On the other hand, it increases the chance of
obtaining a job and thus the employment rate, which, in turn, increases the distance to jobs
for the employed worker located at x = L. This raises the spatial compensation and thus
the wage.
For the model to make sense, we assume that y > w∗
L so that ﬁrms do not make negative
proﬁts. This is equivalent to:













L is deﬁned by (23), F∗(wL) is


































for 0 ≤ x ≤ L
sτ (N − x) for L < x ≤ N
0 for x > N
(28)
Observe that all workers participate to the labor market because they all search for a job





2.4 Interaction between land and labor markets

















Not surprisingly, when y, the productivity of workers, increases, ﬁrms’ proﬁts increase. The
eﬀects of wU, s, τ and N only go through the wage w∗
L and thus when they increase w∗
L,
ﬁrms’ proﬁts are reduced. The ambiguity of s stems from the ambiguity of the eﬀect of s
on w∗
L mentioned above. On the other hand, aU and δ aﬀect both the employment in the
ﬁrm l(wL) and the wage w∗
L. As a result, when aU increases or δ decreases, then both the
employment l(wL) and the wage w∗
L increase, and thus the eﬀect on proﬁts is ambiguous.
However, if the productivity y is high enough, then the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates the second one,
and the net impact is positive.
Second, by diﬀerentiating the equilibrium land rent (28), for the employed workers, i.e.














These results are mainly due to the competition on the land market. Indeed, when aU
increases or δ decreases, then the employment level N(1 − u∗) in the economy increases,
which means that employed workers are on average further away from jobs. The access to
the job center becomes more valuable, which increases the competition in the land market
since employed workers bear higher commuting costs than the unemployed workers. As
a result, housing prices increase in locations between x = 0 and x = L but not in the
unemployment area, i.e. for x ∈ ]L,N]. Figure 1 illustrates this eﬀect. Before the shock (i.e.
12increase in aU or decrease in δ), the land rent is given by the “standard” line while after,
it is described by the thick line. The equilibrium values with one and two stars correspond
respectively to before and after the shock. Finally, an increase in τ, s or N, increases the
competition in the land market because it becomes more costly to travel to the job center
and therefore housing prices increase.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
3 Ex ante heterogenous workers
Following Albrecht and Axell (1984) and Gaumont et al. (2006), we now assume that there
are two types of individuals in the economy who diﬀer according to the value imputed to
leisure. This assumption ensures that there can be at most two wages oﬀered in equilibrium.
Individuals are denoted by superscript i = 0,1. Because the ﬁrst individual is assumed to


















where ui = Ui/Ni is the unemployment rate of type−i workers.
3.1 Urban land-use equilibrium
In equilibrium, there will be four types of workers: the unemployed workers of types 0 and





L (this will be shown below). As we will also see below, in equilibrium, workers
of both types 0 and 1 can earn the high wage w1
L while only workers of types 0 can earn the
low wage w0
L. As the result, for employed workers, types do not always correspond to wages.
13We now relax the assumption of housing consumption equal to 1 for all workers and assume





L > hU = 1 (31)
where hi
L is the housing consumption of an employed worker earning a wage wi
L and hU is
the housing consumption of an unemployed worker. Even though it can be confusing to use
the same notation i for workers’ types and workers’ wages, we keep it to avoid too many
notations. Assumption (31) reﬂects the fact that richer workers consume more land, which is
a well documented fact (see e.g. Glaeser et al., 2007). Observe that, because the unemployed
have the same revenue wU, then they all consume the same amount of land hU. As above,
we can write the instantaneous (indirect) utility functions of an employed worker earning a
wage wi










U(x) = wU − s
i τ x − R(x)
Observe that the type i = 0,1 of a worker plays a role only when they are unemployed since
it determines si. The type i is however irrelevant when they are employed since what matters
is only the wage. As a result, in Wi
U(x), the superscript i indicates the type of workers while,
in Wi
L(x), it represents the type of wage a worker earns. As we will see below, this will not
be true for the intertemporal utilities since someone employed has to take into account the
fact that he/she may be unemployed in the future and thus his/her type will matter even
when employed. This is why there are four diﬀerent instantaneous utilities but ﬁve diﬀerent
intertemporal utilities. Let us now determine the bid rents of the employed and unemployed











U(x,WU) = wU − s
iτ x − W
i
U
Depending on the assumptions we make, diﬀerent types of urban equilibria can emerge.
Because we want to be consistent with the previous section, we would like to focus on an
14equilibrium where the employed workers reside closer to jobs than the unemployed workers.






which guarantees that, starting from the BD, we ﬁrst locate the type−0 employed, then the
type−1 employed, then the type−1 unemployed and, ﬁnally, the type−0 unemployed.4
Deﬁnition 2 Assume (31) and (32). Then, an urban-land use equilibrium with ex ante
























































at each x ∈ (0,N]
The interpretation of the equilibrium conditions are similar to the ones given in Deﬁnition
1, the only diﬀerence being that there are now three borders to be considered. Since U0 =
u0N0, L0 = (1 − u0)N0, and L = N − u0N0 − u1N1, solving these equations leads to:
W
0∗










































































then we would have had an urban conﬁguration where all the unemployed workers reside close to jobs while
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τ u1N1 for L0 < x ≤ L
s1τ (N − x) − (s1 − s0)τ u0N0 for L < x ≤ N − U0
s0τ (N − x) for N − U0 < x ≤ N
0 for x > N
(37)
The eﬀects are here more complicated than for the homogenous case but the intuition remains
the same. Indeed, the interaction between the land and the labor market is done through
the wages w0
L and w1
L and the unemployment rates u0 and u1. Here also, an increase in u0
and/or u1 increase the workers’ utility but decrease the equilibrium land rent.
3.2 Labor-market equilibrium
Firms post wages. Let θ ∈ [0,1] be the fraction of ﬁrms posting the high wage w1
L and
thus 1 − θ the fraction posting the low wage w0
L. As in the previous section, given any
distribution of posted wages F(wL), each worker of type i will have a reservation wage wri
L
such that he/she accepts a job if wL ≥ wri




should also be clear that, in equilibrium, no ﬁrm will post anything other than the reservation
wage of workers, as a ﬁrm posting wL ∈ (wr0
L ,wr1
L ) could reduce wL down to wr0
L and make
more proﬁt per worker without changing the set of workers who accept. This was the same
argument made in the proof of Proposition 1.
Unemployed workers Since we already know that the only two posted wages are wr1
L
and wr0






































U is the value function of an unemployed worker of type i = 0,1 while I
i,j
L is the
value function of an employed worker of type i = 0,1 and earning a wage j = 0,1, where the
superscript j corresponds to a wage w
rj
L .
16We will now proceed as follows. We assume that wr1
L > wr0
L and we will then ﬁnd a
condition that validates this assumption (see Proposition 3 below). As a result, a value
function I
1,0
L cannot exist since a type−1 worker will always refuse a job oﬀer with a wage
wr0
L . Indeed, type−1 workers accept the high wage wr1
L but not the low wage wr0
L while
































Employed workers Similarly, the relevant steady state Bellman equations for the em 







































































δ + s1 aU θ
(46)
Indeed, workers of type 0 accept any job oﬀer (wr0∗
L or wr1∗
L ) while workers of type 1 only
accept high wage jobs, which arrive at rate s1 aU θ. As a result, the higher the fraction of
ﬁrms posting the high wage, the lower the unemployment rate for type−1 workers.
Wages We have the following result:
Proposition 3 The ﬁrms post the following wages:
w
r1∗









































r + δ + s1aU θ

















s0aU θ(s1 − s0 − (1 − s0h0
L)) − (1 − s0h0
L)(r + δ)




















Proof. See the Appendix.
This proposition conﬁrms that wr1∗
L > wr0∗
L , which is not always true since there is a short 
run cost (higher commuting costs) and a long run gain (higher contact rate with ﬁrms) of
providing search eﬀort. Inequality (49) is a suﬃcient condition that involves only parameters
and guarantees that wr1∗
L > wr0∗
L . As can be seen in the Appendix, the high wage wr1∗
L is
determined by (61), i.e. W 1∗
L = W1∗
U while the low wage wr0∗




(r + δ)W 0∗
U + s0aU θW 1∗
L
r + δ + s0aU θ
18These two conditions are roughly equivalent to the ones obtained in the non spatial case
where wages and unemployment beneﬁts are involved instead of utilities (see Gaumont et
al., 2006, page 834). What is crucial here is the fact that the competition in the land market














Contrary to the non spatial model, the high wage wr1∗
L depends on θ because an increase in
θ aﬀects negatively u1, which aﬀects the location of workers in city (the employed are closer






(r + δ)(s1 − s0)s0aUτ





















∂θ < 0. A similar eﬀect was present in the non spatial model, but it was always
positive. Here the mechanism is quite diﬀerent since it goes through u1 and thus the com 
petition in the land market while, in the non spatial model, it was through the job contact
rate s0aU θ.
Firms Instead of following the approach of Albrecht and Axell (1984) as we did in
the previous section, we now follow that of Gaumont et al. (2006) because it is simpler.
Of course the two approaches are equivalent. Firms maximize steady state proﬁts. There
are two types of ﬁrms i = 0,1; those oﬀering the high wage wr1∗
L (type−1 ﬁrms) and those
oﬀering the low wage wr0∗











where ρi is the probability that a random unemployed worker accepts a job oﬀer at wage
wri∗
L and aF is the exogenous rate at which a ﬁrm meets a worker. A job match is when
these two events are realized, which occurs at rate aFρi.
For a type−1 ﬁrm posting the high wage wr1∗
L , ρ1 = 1 since a job oﬀer is never turned






19since a job oﬀer is only accepted by unemployed workers of type 0. Using (45) and (46), this
can be written as:
ρ
0 =
(δ + s1 aU θ)N0
(δ + s1 aU θ)N0 + (δ + s0 aU)N1 (51)
In order to avoid the Diamond’s paradox (Proposition 1), i.e. only the lowest wage
is posted in equilibrium, one needs to write a condition that guarantees that both wages
wr0∗
L and wr1∗
L coexist in equilibrium. For that, it has to be that, in equilibrium, ﬁrms are
indiﬀerent between posting wr0∗
L and wr1∗
L , otherwise the two wages cannot coexist together.
This is an iso proﬁt condition. Let us thus calculate the proﬁts Π0 and Π1.
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where the wages wr1∗
L and wr0∗
L are given by (47) and (48), respectively. The iso proﬁt




















Observe that θ enters in wr0∗
L and wr1∗
L through u1. We have the following result:
Proposition 4 The suﬃcient conditions for a non degenerate labor-market equilibrium (i.e.
0 < θ∗ < 1) to exist and to be unique are y < y < y, where y and y are respectively deﬁned
by (66) and (67) in the Appendix.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Even if the conditions are much more complicated than for the non spatial model, the
intuition remains the same. The productivity y has to be large enough to prevent that all
ﬁrms pay the lowest wage wr0∗
L and low enough to prevent that all ﬁrms pay the highest wage
wr1∗
L . In other words, to obtain wage dispersion, the productivity y has to have intermediate





20The steady state general equilibrium is then easy to calculate. We assume (29), (31),
(32), (49), and y < y < y. The value of θ∗ is given by (64) in the Appendix. Then, plugging
this value in (51) and (46), we obtain respectively ρ0∗, the equilibrium probability a random
unemployed worker accepts a job oﬀer at wage wr0∗
L and the equilibrium unemployment rate
u1∗ (the other unemployment rate u0∗ is only function of parameters and determined by
(45)). By plugging these values of unemployment rates u0∗ and u1∗ and the value of θ∗ in
(48) and (47), we obtain the wages wr0∗
L and wr1∗
L . Furthermore, by plugging these values of
the wages wr0∗
L and wr1∗
L and the value of θ∗ in (52) and (53), we obtain ﬁrms’ equilibrium
proﬁts Π0∗ and Π1∗. Finally, using the values of the wages and the unemployment rates in
(33)−(37), we obtain the equilibrium utilities W0∗
U , W1∗
U , W 0∗
L , W 1∗
L , and the equilibrium
land rent R∗(x).
3.3 Numerical simulations
We would now like to run some numerical simulations of the model. It seems quite natural
to interpret type−0 and type−1 workers as black and white workers, respectively. Indeed,
it is assumed that all workers are ex ante identical (same productivity, same unemployment
beneﬁt, etc.) with one diﬀerence: search intensities are higher for whites than for blacks,
i.e. s1 > s0. This is a well documented fact (see, e.g. Patacchini and Zenou, 2005 for the
UK, and Holzer et al., 1994, Johnson, 2006, for the US). In our model, search intensities also
capture commuting cost diﬀerences since unemployed workers mainly search by commuting
to the business district (BD). In this interpretation, when there are unemployed, whites
have higher pecuniary commuting costs per unit of distance than blacks since s1τ > s0τ.
Observe that we have considered an equilibrium where type 0 unemployed workers are very
far away from jobs. In most American cities, it is indeed the case that poor (unemployed)
black workers reside in inner cities located far away from jobs.
The unit time is one quarter of a year. The interest rate is set at r = 0.01, which reﬂects
the U.S. historical annual rate of 4%. The job destruction rate is set at δ = 0.055 (implying
an average duration of employment of 4 years and 2 months) to match with the sample
average for the quarterly job destruction rate of 5.5% (Davis and Haltiwanger, 1992). We
set the job contact rate at aU = 4.75, implying on average a contact with a ﬁrm every 19
days. As in the 1990 US Census, the fraction of black workers is set at 13 percent, i.e.
N0/N = 0.13 (see for example McCall, 2001). The ﬁrms’ contact rate aF = 1.5, which is
21a consistent with an average vacancy duration of 60 days reported in van Ours and Ridder
(1992).
We would like to match the 1990 Census unemployment rates for blacks and whites, which
are equal to u0∗ = 12.6% (Black or African American) and u1∗ = 5.3% (White), respectively.
To match these unemployment rates, we have seven parameters: the unemployment beneﬁt
wU, productivity y, commuting costs τ, search eﬀorts of black and white workers, i.e. s0 and
s1, and housing consumption of black and white workers, i.e. h0
L and h1
L. These parameters
have to respect the conditions imposed by the model that is (29), (31), and (32). Table 1
summarizes the diﬀerent values given to the variables.
Table 1. Parameter values
y =1.05044 Productivity r =0.01 Pure discount rate
wU =0.32 Unemployment beneﬁt δ =0.055 Job-destruction rate
aF =1.5 Firms’ job contact rate aU =4.75 Workers’ job contact rate
N0/N =13% Percentage of blacks (type 0) N1/N =87% Percentage of whites (type 1)
τ =0.1 Pecuniary commuting cost
s0 =0.08 Search eﬀort of blacks (type 0) s1 =0.24 Search eﬀort of whites (type 1)
h0
L=1.1 Housing consumption of of blacks (type 0) h1
L=1.2 Housing consumption of of whites (type 1)
3.3.1 Steady-state equilibrium
Let us calculate the steady state equilibrium for these parameters values. The numerical
results of the equilibrium are displayed in Table 2.
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L ) 0.083 (8.26)
Π∗ = Π0 = Π1 0.36
As can be seen in Table 2, we obtain values of unemployment rates of white and black
workers (i.e., 5.3% and 12.6%, respectively) that match the 1990 US Census. Concerning
wages, there is no much diﬀerence between blacks and whites (wr1∗/wr0∗ = 1.04), which is
roughly what is observed for low skilled workers in the United States (Grodsky and Pager,
2001; Jaynes, 1990). Furthermore, in equilibrium, 86 percent of ﬁrms post the high wage
w1r∗
L , which is again consistent with the data since it implies that there are 86 percent of
ﬁrms employing white workers in this economy.
Moreover, the arrival rates for type−0 (black) and type−1 (white) workers are respec 
tively given by s0aU = 0.38 and s1aU θ = 0.98, which imply that the average duration of
unemployment is seven and half months for blacks and three months for whites. Further 
more, ρ0∗, the probability that a random unemployed worker accepts a job oﬀer at wage
wr0∗
L , is equal to 26.24%. This means that the ﬁrms that post the high wage will transform
a contact into a match with probability 1 while this will be true only in 26.24 percent of
the time for ﬁrms posting the low wage since type−1 workers will always refuse such an
oﬀer. Since each ﬁrm has a contact with a worker every 20 days (i.e. aF = 1.5), this also
means that, on average, a match occurs every month for ﬁrms posting the low wage. Table
2 also gives the diﬀerent utilities (both instantaneous and intertemporal) and one can see
that, because of a ﬁercer competition in the land market for employed workers, their utilities
are not always higher than that of the unemployed workers. Finally, Figure 2 illustrates
23Proposition 4 by showing that, for low values of the productivity y (i.e. y ≃ 0.6), θ∗ ≈ 0
while for high values of y (i.e. y ≃ 1), θ∗ ≥ 1 .
[Insert Figure 2 here]
3.3.2 Interaction between land and labor markets
We would like to pursue our analysis by investigating the interaction between land and
labor markets. For that, let us study the impact of a key labor market variable, y, on the
equilibrium land price R∗(x). Figure 3 displays the result (the variables with one and two
stars are respectively the equilibrium values before and after a change in y; the normal and
thick lines correspond respectively to before and after the increase of y). Remember that Li
is the area in the city where the employed workers earning wir∗
L reside while Ui is the area
in the city where type−i unemployed workers live. Looking at (37), an increase in y aﬀects
the bid rents and thus the competition in the land market only through u1. In particular,
y aﬀects negatively u1 since the latter is a negative function of θ, which is itself a positive
function of y. So when y increases, the areas L0 = (1 − u0)N0 and U0 = u0N0 are not
aﬀected while L1 = (1 − u1)N1 expands and U1 = u1N1 shrinks (Figure 3). This is due to
the fact that only the bid rents of the employed workers are aﬀected by a change in y, and

































Ui(x) are the equilibrium land rents at a distance x for the employed
workers earning wir∗
L and type−i unemployed workers, respectively.
[Insert Figure 3 here]
To better understand this result, Figures 4a, 4b, and 4c display the impact of y on the
land rent at x = 0, x = L0, and x = L, respectively. In these ﬁgures, one can see that
the relationship is positive for R∗(0) and R∗(L0) but negative for R∗(L). Indeed, as stated
above, when y increases, the employed’s bid rents increase because the competition in the
land market is ﬁercer due to the fact the unemployment rate u1 decreases. So at x = 0 and
24at x = L0 land rents increase because the bid rents of workers earning both w0r∗
L and w1r∗
L
increase and these locations are not aﬀected by a change in y (see Figure 3). Now, when y
increases, Ψ1
L(x,WL), the bid rent of workers with high wages, increases while Ψ0
L(x,WL),
the bid rent of type−0 unemployed workers, is not aﬀected. As a result, the location x = L
shifts rightward (from L∗ to L∗∗), which makes the competition in the land market less ﬁerce
and thus the land price decreases. This is an interesting eﬀect of workers’ productivity on
housing prices. Similar results can be obtained with other labor market variables such as, for
example, the job destruction rate δ, which aﬀects the equilibrium land rent only indirectly
through u1.
[Insert Figures 4a,4b,4c here]
3.3.3 Policy implications
Let us analyze some policy implications of the model. It has often been advocated that
reducing commuting costs could be an eﬃcient tool to improve the labor market outcomes
of black workers in the United States (see, in particular, Pugh, 1998). In the context of our
model, we examine the impact of a reduction of the commuting cost τ on the equilibrium
labor market variables, w0r∗
L , w1r∗
L , θ∗, u1∗, and Π∗. The eﬀects are complex since τ directly
aﬀects the land market through the land rent and the instantaneous utilities but also indi 
rectly aﬀects the labor market through the wages. Let us better understand these eﬀects.
By diﬀerentiating equations (33) to (36), one can see that an increase in τ, decreases the
utilities of the unemployed workers of both types (i.e. W0
U and W1
U) but has an ambiguous
eﬀect on the utilities of the employed workers. Indeed, when τ increases, the competition in
the land market increases, so all workers pay higher housing prices and thus their utilities
decrease. This is the direct eﬀect. There is, however, an indirect eﬀect that goes through
u1, since the latter is negatively aﬀected by θ, which itself is aﬀected by τ. So when τ
increases, u1 changes, which aﬀects the location workers in the city, which, in turn, aﬀects
the competition in the land market and thus the utilities. The latter indirect eﬀect is only
true for the employed workers as can be seen in equations (35) and (36).
Figure 5a displays the relationship between commuting costs and wages. Decreasing
commuting costs increase the wage for both black and white workers. Take for example
w1
L = w1r∗
L . By diﬀerentiating (47) with respect to τ, one can see that, holding u1, constant,
the relationship is positive. Indeed, as stated above, when τ increases, at a given u1, the
25competition in the land market becomes ﬁercer so that bid rents increase and thus all utilities
decrease. Since w1r∗
L is determined by W 1∗
L = W1∗
U , then because these two utilities decrease
and only the ﬁrst one is a function of w1r∗
L , then, following a raise in τ, this wage has to
increase for this equality to be true. Now, when we also take into account the fact that
u1 is a positive function of τ (this eﬀect is indirect and goes through θ), the net eﬀect is
ambiguous. In the numerical example, the indirect negative eﬀect is greater that the positive
direct eﬀect and thus the net eﬀect is negative. The same intuition runs for the low wage
w0
L = w0r∗.
[Insert Figure 5a here]
Figures 5b, 5c, and 5d display the other comparative statics results. Not surprisingly,
a reduction in the commuting cost τ decreases θ∗, the fraction of ﬁrms oﬀering the high
wage, but increases u1∗, the unemployment rate of white workers, and Π∗, ﬁrms’ proﬁt. The
intuition of these results is similar to that of the wages since the eﬀect goes through the
land market. The crucial aspect here is the fact that the land market ampliﬁes the eﬀect
of the labor market. Observe that, in our model, commuting costs do not aﬀect blacks’
unemployment rate because they accept any job oﬀer (w0
L or w1
L). As a result, θ (the
fraction of ﬁrms posting the high wage w1
L), which is a function of commuting costs, does
not aﬀect blacks’ unemployment rate.
[Insert Figures 5b,5c,5d here]
4 Extension: Diﬀerent commuting costs
In the previous section, workers were supposed to have heterogeneous utilities from leisure
time, which was only reﬂected in their labor market search behavior but not in their com 
muting costs. It is well documented that a large part of the cost of commuting is time cost.
It seems therefore reasonable to now extend the model so that the commuting cost per unit
of distance τ is not constant across workers with diﬀering time costs (opportunity costs to






Let us start with the urban land use equilibrium. As before, there will be four types of
workers: the unemployed workers of types 0 and 1, with search intensities and commuting






























which guarantees that, starting from the BD, we ﬁrst locate the type−0 employed, then the
type−1 employed, then the type−1 unemployed and, ﬁnally, the type−0 unemployed. Using
Deﬁnition 2, we can solve this equilibrium and obtain the following equilibrium values for
the diﬀerent utility functions:
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Let us now focus on the labor market equilibrium. Solving the model exactly as before, we
obtain the following result:
Proposition 5 The ﬁrms post the following wages:
w
r1∗









































s0N [(r + δ)τ0 + s1τ1aU θ]

















s0aU θ(s0τ0 + s1τ1) − (τ1 − h1

































Thus, even if the model becomes more complicated, all the results of the previous section
are preserved.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we propose a search urban model where ﬁrms post wages. We ﬁrst develop a
model where all workers are identical and show that there is a unique equilibrium wage even
in the presence of search frictions. We investigate the interaction between land and labor
markets and show, in particular, that higher unemployment rate increases the employed
workers’ utility but decreases the equilibrium housing price in the employment area. We
then develop a model where there are two types of workers who diﬀer according to the
value imputed to leisure. We show that, under some conditions, two wages will emerge in
equilibrium so that the Diamond paradox does not hold anymore. One interesting aspect of
the results is to analyze how the two markets (land and labor) interact with each other. We
show that the commuting cost τ directly aﬀects the land market through the land rent and
the instantaneous utilities but also indirectly aﬀects the labor market through the wages.
Another interesting and testable result is the impact of workers’ productivity on housing
prices. The impact can be positive or negative depending on the location in the city.
This model can easily be generalized to K > 2 types of workers where there will be
K reservation wages w1∗
L ,...,wK∗




θi = 1 (see Gaumont et al., 2006). In our spatial model, this model will
be very cumbersome to analyze since we will have to locate K types of workers in the city
but it is clearly possible. However, this will not add very much in terms of intuition of the
results compared to the case when K = 2.
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which is (19).





δ + saU [1 − F(wr
L)]
< 0
Thus, since the proﬁt is decreasing in wages when wL ≥ wr
L, ﬁrms will set the lowest
possible wage, which is w∗
L = wr
L. No deviation is proﬁtable since a lower wage than wr
L
leads to a zero proﬁt and a higher wage does not increase neither productivity nor l(wL) but
increase the cost of labor and thus leads to a lower proﬁt.
Proof of Proposition 3. We will proceed as follows. We assume that wr1
L > wr0
L and










which using (34) and (35) leads to (47).
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(62)
By solving (62) using (33), (35), (36) and (47), we obtain (48).
Let us now show that wr1∗
L > wr0∗






r + δ + s1aU θ
r + δ + s0aU θ
 
s






















(s1 − s0)(r + δ)































(r + δ)(s1 − s0)












(s1 − s0)(r + δ)





























[1 − (1 − h1
Ls1)u1](r + δ + s0aU θ)














Because 1 − (1 − h1
Ls1)u1 > 0 (since the unemployment rate u1 < 1), a suﬃcient condition


























which is equivalent to (49).
Proof of Proposition 4. Using the wages wr1∗
L and wr0∗
L deﬁned by (47) and (48),
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which is equivalent to:
δN0
(δ + s0 aU)h1
LN1 +
s1 aUN0
(δ + s0 aU)h1
LN1 θ
∗ =
(X + y)(δ + s1 aU θ∗) + (1 − h1
Ls1)τ N1δ
Zh1




Let us deﬁne the following functions:
f(θ) =
δN0
(δ + s0 aU)h1
LN1 +
s1 aUN0
(δ + s0 aU)h1
LN1 θ
g(θ) =
(X + y)(δ + s1 aU θ∗) + (1 − h1
Ls1)τ N1δ
Zh1




Then θ∗ is deﬁned by f(θ) = g(θ). Observe that
f(0) =
δN0





(δ + s0 aU)h1
LN1 > 0
g(0) =
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First, we want that: f(0) < g(0). This is equivalent to:
δN0
(δ + s0 aU)h1
LN1 <
X + y + (1 − h1
Ls1)τ N1
Zh1
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Z − X (66)
It is easy to verify that y > y so the two conditions y > y and y > y reduces to y > y.
So far we have shown that f(0) < g(0), f′(θ) > 0 and g′(θ) < 0. This guarantees that
there exists a unique and strictly positive θ∗. Let us now show that θ∗ < 1. We have:
f(1) =
δ + s1 aU





X (δ + s1 aU) + (1 − h1
Ls1)τ N1δ
Y h1




So, if when θ∗ = 1, f(1) > g(1), then we are certain that θ∗ < 1 since the intersection
between f(θ) and g(θ) occurs before f(θ) > g(θ). The condition f(1) > g(1) is equivalent
to:
(δ + s1 aU)N0
(δ + s0 aU)h1
LN1 >
X (δ + s1 aU) + (1 − h1
Ls1)τ N1δ
Y h1













(δ + s0 aU)h1
LN1 −
δ (1 − h1
Ls1)τ N1
δ + s1 aU
− X
(67)
The results then follow.
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Figure 1. Impact of an increase in      or a decrease in δ
on the equilibrium land rent
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Figure 2. Impact of the productivity y on θ 
 





















Figure 3: Impact of an increase in the productivity y 
on the equilibrium land rent
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Figure 4a. Impact of the productivity y on the land rent at x = 0 














Figure 4b. Impact of the productivity y on the land rent at x = 
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Figure 4c. Impact of the productivity y on the land rent at x = L 
 
 










Figure 5a. Impact of the commuting cost τ on wages  
(solid line 
1
L w , dash line 
0
L w ) 
 
 


















Figure 5b. Impact of the commuting cost τ on θ 
 
 












Figure 5c. Impact of the commuting cost τ on the unemployment rate 
















Figure 5d. Impact of the commuting cost τ on the profit 
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